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Abstract 
This study seeks to examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance of companies 
listed in Abu Dhabi stock exchange. It is argued in this paper that strong corporate governance mechanisms are 
expected to have a positive impact on performance measures. 
The dataset is drawn from the Abu Dhabi exchange Shareholding Company’s guide for years 2007-2011.The 
study uses pooled regression analysis on 281 firm/year observations.In this regard, two measures of firm 
performance are used; Tobin’s Q score and Return on Assets (ROA), on the other hand independent variables 
include institutional ownership, governmental ownership, board size, and audit quality. The study controls for 
the relationship between the dependent and independent variables by including firm size, debt ratio, dividend 
yield, and age as control variables. 
Results showed significant positive impact of corporate governance measures on firm performance (except for 
Audit quality). Results obtained inthis research paper provide further evidence on the importance of corporate 
governance mechanisms on stock market participants’ valuation of listed companies. In addition, it makes us 
understand to some extent the attitudes of shareholders toward good corporate governance practices.The 
importance of this research paper stems from the fact that it is conducted in an emerging economy which has 
recently adopted a corporate governance code. In this regard, the UAE has put into action the new corporate 
governance code on 2007 and made it mandatory on all listed companies as on 2010, the current study focus on 
this period. As far as the current researcher is aware of, prior studies conducted in the UAE context were cross-
sectional in nature and conducted before the implementation of the new code.  
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1. Introduction: 
In the past two decades attention toward issues related to corporate governance has been increasing as a result of 
a series of financial and economic events occurring around the world.  In this regard, high profile financial 
scandals, financial crisis, and unexpected corporate failure have driven countries to strengthen their corporate 
laws in order to increase the confidence in financial markets (Solomon, 2010). As one of the most newly 
established financial markets in the Middle East, the United Arab Emirates has always considered the 
importance of keeping its financial markets (Dubai Financial Market and Abu Dhabi Financial Market) to be 
viewed by the stock market participants as safe, stable, transparent, and protected by the law. One of these laws 
is related to corporate governance.  
Corporate governance might be viewed as the relationship between a company’s management and shareholders. 
It is defined as “the system by which business corporations are directed and controlled” (Rankin, et al.2012: 
188).It is widely believed that the implementation of a good corporate governance framework presents 
companies a structured path to better management practices, effective oversight and control mechanisms which 
lead to opportunities for growth, financing and improved performance (Solomon, 2010). In this regard, countries 
with newly established, yet promising, financial markets such as the UAE consider the adoption of corporate 
governance code as a must in order to build up a confidence and to attract and sustain investments.  The 
implementation of corporate governance code is seen by the UAE government as a priority when enhancing its 
financial markets. 
As it is discussed later in this paper, the UAE corporate governance code was issued in 2007 and was mandatory 
on all listed companies in 2010. As far as the current researcher is aware of, only one study in the UAE context 
was conducted to examine the impact of corporate governance on firm performance. However,Aljifri and 
Moustafa (2007) conducted their study by covering cross-sectional data in the year 2004 when the UAE 
corporate law was silent regarding corporate governance issues. The current study extends what was investigated 
by Aljifri and Moustafa (2007) by examining the period of implementing the new UAE corporate governance 
code (i.e. 2007-2011).  
 
2. UAE corporate governance regime: 
The economy of the United Arab Emirates is the second largest in the Arab world (after Saudi Arabia), with 
a gross domestic product(GDP) of $377 billion (AED1.38 trillion) in 2012. Since the independence in 1971, 
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UAE's economy has grown by nearly 231 times to AED1.45 trillion in 2013 (John, 2013).Although The United 
Arab Emirates is considered as one of the largest exports of Oil and Gas in the world, the general trend and 
vision in the UAE economy is to reduce its dependency on oil exports by diversifying the economy, particularly 
in the financial, tourism and construction sectors. This has been reflected by the founding father of the UAE the 
Late Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan: 
 
"We must not rely on oil alone as the main source of our national income. We 
have to diversify the sources of our revenue and construct economic projects 
that will ensure a free, stable and dignified life for the people” 
 
As a response, the UAE which is seeking to enhance its economic competitiveness by diversifying its resources 
and by building a knowledge-based economy has taken crucial steps in making the country to be viewed as an 
attractive environment for investments. One of these steps is to strengthen its financial market through ensuring 
that the investing environment in the UAE is safe, stable, protected by the law, and transparent. One of these 
steps is related to the implementation of a corporate governance code on companies listed in the UAE financial 
markets. 
Corporate Governance has been regulated in the UAE through a number of years by the UAE Securities and 
Commodities Authority (SCA). In early 2007, the SCA introduced the UAE code of corporate governance (SCA 
Decision R/32 of 2007). The code detailed the corporate governance requirements that companies should comply 
with. According to the code, listed companies are required to include in their annual reports a “corporate 
governance report” which should contain information about Board Structure and Directors duties and liabilities. 
Also, the corporate governance report should outline information about board committees, Directors’ 
remuneration, internal control, risk management, and the external auditor. In October 2009, a new code 
concerning Corporate Governance was issued by the UAE Ministry of Economy which amended the old code. 
The ministerial resolution No. 518 of 2009 refined, clarified, and updated the old code and made it clear that 
corporate governance disclosures are mandatory  on companies listed in the UAE securities market. In this 
regard, Companies listed in the UAE securities market were given a grace period of three years starting from 
2007 to comply with the code (no later than 30 April 2010).  
The new code places more emphasis on oversight of the management and functions of the board of directors by 
appointing more independent members and non-executive directors, forming committees and having external 
auditor who is neutral and independent to companies activities. Going beyond what is required by the previous 
Code, the External auditor is prohibited to perform any technical, administrative or consultation services or any 
services that may affect its independence.The duties of directors have been further enhanced in accordance with 
international standards. According to the code, the position of chairman of the board of directors and managing 
director should not be held by the same person different individuals. Also, the existence of non-executive 
directors has been increased and as a requirement, the board of any company should at least setup an audit 
committee, a nomination committee and remuneration committee. The audit, nomination and remuneration 
committees must comprise of not less than three non-executive directors, of whom at least two members shall be 
independent members and shall be chaired by either independent members. In this regard,these committees are 
entitled to submit written reports to ensure greater transparency of the procedures, results and recommendations 
that the committee reaches.  
In Addition, thenew code also requires listed companies to have a code of conduct along with other corporate 
internal policies and standards. It requires the board of directors to establish a specific internal control system, to 
assess risk management and ensure a thoroughexecution of the governance rules. Most importantly, the new 
code also requireslisted companies to apply environmental and social policies requiring greater corporate social 
responsibility. 
 
3. Literature Review and hypotheses development 
Corporate governance literature is originally linked to the pioneer work of Jensen and Meckling (1976).  
According to the agency theory as presented by Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency problems occur when the 
interests of agents are not aligned with those of principals. Depending on the parties involved in conflicts, 
agency problems can be categorized as: managerial agency (between stockholders and management); debt 
agency (between stockholders and bondholders); social agency (between private and public sectors); and 
political agency (between agents of the public sector and the rest of society or taxpayers). According to Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), shareholders are the residual claimants after other parties, and thus shareholders’ rights are 
the weakest. Corporate governance is therefore mainly designed to protect and promote the interests of 
shareholders. This paper will focus on the agency-principal problems between managers and stockholders. 
The following section is designed to provide a discussion regarding hypothesis development of the study. 
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3.1. Government Ownership 
The direction of the relationship between government ownership and firm performance in prior literature was not 
conclusive. One school of thoughts suggested a negative relationshipbetween government ownership and firm 
performance (Miggenson and Netter, 2001; Xu and Wang, 1999; Mak and Li, 2001). Generally, these studies 
argued that privately owned firms are more efficient and more profitable than state owned firms. Mak and Li 
(2001) explained that government tends to be less active in monitoring its investments. They claim the weaker 
accountability and monitoring of state-owned firms’ financial performance, as well as easier access to financing, 
are likely to reduce the incentives of such firms to adopt strong governance mechanisms. 
However, the negative relationship between government ownership and firm performance should not be 
generalized. Prior literature indicated that the direction of the relationship depends on the country under 
examination. While the study conducted by Xu and Wang (1999) in the Chinese context indicated a negative 
relationship, studies conducted in Kuwait, UAE, Malaysia, and Singapore found a significant positive 
relationship between government ownership and firm performance (Aljifri and Moustafa, 2007; Najid and Abdul 
Rahman, 2001; Ang and Ding, 2006; and Alfaraih, et. al., 2012). In this regard, Eng and Mack (2003) explained 
that government owned firms tend to mitigate the problem of asymmetric information that results from imperfect 
information about the value of the firms given to investors and that such firms are also generally able to gain 
easier access to different sources of financing as compared with other firms. In addition, government owned 
firms may face less pressure to comply with financial reporting regulations, which might motivate management 
to select accounting choices that improve firms’ performance (Aljifri and Moustafa, 2007).  
Based on the above arguments, it is expected in the UAE environment that the relationship between government 
ownership and firm performance will have a positive direction due to the fact that the UAE government is 
continuously and heavily supporting initiatives and laws that ensures investors protection in the UAE financial 
markets. Also, the UAE government is acting as a role model for other businesses in terms of transparency 
corporate monitoring. So it is expected that the UAE Government ownership in listed companies will act as a CG 
mechanism and is expected to have a positive impact on firm performance. 
H1: Ceteris paribus there is a significant positive relationship between Government ownership and firm 
value  
Institutional Ownership 
The involvement of institutional investors has emerged as a vital force in corporate monitoring and as a 
mechanism to protect the interest of minority shareholders. The term institutions refer to the ownership stake in a 
company that is held by large financial organizations, insurance companies corporate pension funds, college 
endowments, commercial banks, hedge funds, mutual funds, and boutique asset management firms (Al-Malkawi 
and Pillai, 2012). 
Prior studies have produced mixed results. Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) and Lowenstein (1991), for 
instance, find little evidence that institutional ownership is correlated with firm performance. 
On the other hand, Demsetz (1983), Shliefer and Vishney (1986), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Lehmann and 
Weigand (2000), Larcker et al. (2004) and Hashim and Devi (2004) report that there is a positive relation 
between firm value and ownership by institutional investors. In the UAE context and on a cross-sectional study 
conducted in 2004 covering 51 firms,Aljifiri and Moustafa (2007) found a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and firm performance. 
H2: Ceteris paribus there is a significant positive relationship between Institutional ownership and firm 
value  
3.3. Board Size 
With regard to a relationship between the size of a board and a firm’s performance, there are two distinct schools 
of thoughts. The first school of thought argues that a smaller board size will contribute more to the success of a 
firm (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). However, the second school of thought considers 
that a large board size will improve a firm’s performance (Pfeffer, 1972; Klein, 1998; Coles et. al., 2008). These 
studies indicate that a large board will support and advise firm management more effectively because of a 
complex of business environment and an organizational culture (Klein, 1998). Moreover, a large board size will 
gather much more information. As a result, a large board size appears to be better for firm performance (Dalton 
et. al., 1999). 
H3: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant positive relationship between Board size and firm performance. 
3.4 Audit Type  
Agency theory and information suppression hypothesis state that there is a relationship between auditor type and 
firm performance and. It is suggested that the higher audit quality may control opportunistic management 
behaviors, reduce agency costs and, consequently, increase the firm value in the marketplace. In consistent with 
this argument, Aljifiri and Moustafa (2007) find empirically a significant positive relationship between auditor 
type and firm performance. Thus, the expected sign for the effect of external auditor type on firm performance is 
positive.  
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H4: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between auditor type and firm performance.  
 
4. Data and Methodology 
This study seeks to examine the impact of Corporate Governance on firm performance in emerging markets 
using UAE listed companies as a sample. The dataset is drawn from the Abu Dhabi company guide for years 
2007-2011 as published by Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX). From this dataset companies that failed to 
report financial information and companies whose shares were not traded in the ADX during the examined 
period were excluded from the study. Based on that, 281 firm/year observations were included in the analysis.  
Table 1 below provides information related to number of firms included in the study per year. As mentioned 
earlier, total number of observations is 281 firm/year observations. This covers years 2007-2011.   
Table 1 
Sample of the study 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 total 
Number of listed companies 64 65 67 64 67 327 
Number of companies excluded  10 7 9 11 9 46 
Companies included in the sample 54 58 58 53 58 281 
Pooled OLS regression models are applied for the 281 firm/year observations. The following two modelsare 
used: 
Model (1) 
Tobin's Q = α + β1 (GOV) + β2 (INST) + β3 (BSize) + β4 (AUDIT) + β5 (LnTA) + β6 (DRATIO) + β7 (DYLD) 
+ β8 (AGE) + εit 
Model (2) 
ROA = α + β1 (GOV) + β2 (INST) + β3 (BSize) + β4 (AUDIT) + β5 (LnTA) + β6 (DRATIO) + β7 (DYLD) + 
β8 (AGE) + εit 
Where: 
The dependent variable is firm performance measured as: 
Tobin’s Q = (firm market value – book value of debt)/total assets  
And 
ROA = return on assets ratio; net income/total assets 
α = intercept coefficient of firm i, β = row vector of slope coefficients of regressors; 
(GOV) = proportion of government ownership in the firm 
(INST) = proportion of Institutional ownership in the firm 
(AUDIT) = external auditor type; 1 if the company's accounts are audited by a bug four auditing firm, 0 
otherwise.   
(BSize) = Board size 
(LnTA) = natural logarithm of total assets 
(DRATIO) = Debt Ratio; total debt/total assets. 
(DYLD) = Dividends Yield;  
(AGE) = number of years since establishment 
εit = residual error of firm I in year t.  
 
5. Statistical analyses 
Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the study are presented inTable 2 below.  
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Median SD Min Max 
Tobin's Q 0.880 0.725 0.915 -0.748 5.571 
ROA 0.029 0.046 0.106 -0.586 0.439 
GOV 0.0472 0.000 0.105 0.000 0.912 
INST 0.302 0.256 0.242 0.000 0.998 
BSIZE 8.4 8 0.232 5 13 
DRATIO 0.312 0.301 0.189 0.007 0.957 
DYLD 0.021 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.721 
AGE 21.22 15 14.437 1 44 
LnTA 16.52 16.34 1.25 13.83 20.58 
Table 3 presents the results of the pooled regression analysis covering the two dependent variables (Tobin’s Q 
and ROA). As seen in the table, the two regression models achieved significant F statistic values and the 
adjusted R square values were 30.7% and 39.7% respectively.   
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Results of the regression analysis indicate a significant positive relationship between firm performance and 
Government Ownership, Institutional Ownership and Board Size. These results provide supporting evidence of 
hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 and consistent with prior studies conducted by Aljifri and Moustafa (2007) Najid 
and Abdul Rahman (2001) Ang and Ding (2006) and Alfaraih, et. al. (2012). Hence, corporate governance 
mechanisms related to ownership structure and board size have significant positive impact on firm performance 
in the UAE context. However, Audit type appears to have no significant impact on firm performance. As a 
result, hypothesis H4 is not supported.On the other hand, Size and dividend yield are found to have significant 
positive impact on firm performance while debt ratio reported a significant negative effect.  
Table 3 
Results of the pooled OLS regression 
 Dependent Variable= Tobin's Q Dependent Variable= ROA  
 
 
 
 
VIF 
F Statistics 17.445 25.473 
P value 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R 0.307 0.397 
DW  1.938 1.743 
Independent Variables  Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
GOV 0.138 0.076* 0.084 
 
0.245 1.25 
INST 0.108 
 
0.066* 0.128 
 
0.020** 1.19 
BSIZE 
 
0.124 0.071* 0.134 0.040** 1.21 
AUDIT 
 
0.138 
 
0.269 0.072 
 
0.534 1.36 
LnTA 0.104 
 
0.078* 0.236 
 
0.000*** 1.29 
DRTIO -0.508 
 
0.000*** -0.114 
 
0.023** 1.07 
DYLD 0.170 
 
0.013** 0.613 
 
0.000*** 1.13 
AGE 0.014 
 
0.814 -0.052 
 
0.348 1.32 
*significant ay the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level 
 
6. Summary, Conclusion, and recommendations for further studies 
This study aimed at examining the impact of corporate governance on firm performance in emerging economies 
by focusing on the UAE context. Pooled regression analysis was conducted on a sample of 283 companies listed 
in the Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange covering the period between 2007-2011. Two measures of the dependent 
variable (i.e. Firm performance) were used: Tobin’s Q and ROA. On the other hand, independent variables 
related to corporate governance were measured in terms of four variables, these are: institutional ownership, 
government ownership, board size, and audit type. Moreover, the relationship between the dependent variable 
and the independent variables was controlled by including size, leverage, dividends payout, and age.  
Results of the pooled regression analysis indicated a significant positive impact of corporate governance 
measures (Institutional ownership, Government ownership, and board size) on firm performance. This provides 
two indications, the first is related to positive impact on company’s stock market prices and the other is related to 
company’s profitability. Accordingly, results indicate that companies with strong corporate governance 
mechanisms are perceived positively by the financial market participants which are reflected, in turns, on 
companies’ stock market prices. Also, results of this study indicate that strong corporate governance mechanisms 
influence company performance in terms of generating profits. 
Nevertheless, the issue of corporate governance still needs more investigations in the context of emerging 
economies, especially the UAE. As far as the current researcher is aware of, qualitative studies examining 
attitudes and perceptions regarding corporate governance still to be conducted in emerging economies. Also, it is 
recommended to build up a corporate governance index to assess good corporate governance practice.  
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